Maintenance and flight scheduling of low observable aircraft

In this article, we focus on relatively new maintenance and operational scheduling challenges that are faced by the United States Air Force concerning low‐observable (LO) or stealth aircraft. The LO capabilities of an aircraft degrade stochastically as it flies, making it difficult to make maintenance scheduling decisions. Maintainers can address these damages, but must decide, which aircraft should be put into maintenance, and for how long. Using data obtained from an active duty Air Force F‐22 wing and interviews with Air Force maintainers and program specialists, we model this problem as a generalization of the well‐known restless multiarmed bandit superprocess. Specifically, we use an extension of the traditional model to allow for actions that require varying lengths of time, and generate two separate index policies from a single model; one for maintenance actions and one for the flying action. These index policies allow maintenance schedulers to intuitively, quickly, and effectively rank a fleet of aircraft based on each aircraft's LO status and decide, which aircraft should enter into LO maintenance and for how long, and which aircraft should be used to satisfy daily sortie requirements. Finally, we present extensive data‐driven, detailed simulation results, where we compare the performance of the index policies against policies currently used by the Air Force, as well as some other possible more naive heuristics. The results indicate that the index policies significantly outperform existing policies in terms of fully mission capable (FMC) rates. In particular, the experiments highlight the importance of coordinated maintenance and flying decisions. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:60–80, 2015     

Book Reviews

The purpose of this article is to analyse British strategic nuclear targeting between 1974 and 1979, prior to the successful completion of the sophisticated modification to Polaris submarine-missile system codenamed Chevaline. It will use as its starting point the parameters for UK strategic nuclear targeting, and the foundation of the ‘Moscow Criterion’, prior to the deployment of Britain's Polaris submarines which began in 1968. It will then discuss the recommendation by the Chiefs of Staff to retarget Polaris in 1975/76 and the implications of that recommendation in terms of the British approach to strategic nuclear deterrence. The article will conclude with an assessment of these retargeting decisions on the decision to replace Polaris with the US Trident system in 1980.     

Book reviews

John Horsfield, The Art of Leadership in War. The Royal Navy From the Age of Nelson to the End of World War II. Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. 240; £14.75.

John Joseph Timothy Sweet, Iron Arm: The Mechanization of Mussolini's Army, 1920–1940. Westport, Connecticut &; London: Greenwood Press. 1980. Pp. 207; £15.50.

Peter H. Merkl, The Making of a Stormtrooper. Princeton, N.J: Princeton U.P., 1980. Pp. 328; £8.60.

Greg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945–1950. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980. Pp. 425; $15.00.

Geoffrey Smith and Nelson W. Polsby, British Government and its Discontents. New York: Basic Books, and London: Harper and Row, 1981. Pp. 202; £7.95.

Seweryn Bialer (ed.), The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press and London: Croom Helm, 1981. Pp. 441; £14.95.

Jerry F. Hough, Soviet Leadership in Transition. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution and Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1981. Pp. 175; £12.00 (hb.) and £3.95 (pb.)

Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events 1968–1979. London: Aldwych Press, 1980. Pp. 967; £39.95.

Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941–47; The Road to the Cold War, London: Frank Cass, 1980. Pp. 254; £14.50;

Daniel Heradstveit, The Arab‐Israeli Conflict; Psychological Obstacles to Peace. Oslo: Universittsforlaget, 1979. Pp. 234; £11.60;

Janice Gross Stein, and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision‐making; Israel's Security Choices 1967. Columbus. Ohio; Ohio State University Press, 1980. Pp. 399; $35.     

Population-centric counterinsurgency and the movement of peoples

The theory of population-centric counterinsurgency rests upon the untenable premise that the population within a theater of operations is fixed in place. By showing that people tend to move away from contested rural areas towards the relative safety and prosperity of counterinsurgent-controlled areas, this article demonstrates that this crucial premise is empirically false. Furthermore, a theory of counterinsurgent resource deployment, population movement, and incumbent strategic ineffectiveness is presented. Ultimately, the application of counterinsurgency resources actually dislocates the population from their place of residence and causes them to move into cities. When the urban areas' ability to absorb newcomers is overwhelmed, localized negative externalities emerge and can give rise to crime and insecurity. Such increased insecurity then creates an incentive for the counterinsurgency to retrench its resource use into the cities. As more physical territory is conceded to the insurgency, the relative strategic effectiveness of the counterinsurgency declines.     

A two-phase procedure for allotting geostationary orbital locations to communications satellites

We consider the problem of allotting locations in the geostationary orbit to communication satellites, subject to angle of elevation and electromagnetic interference constraints. An optimization framework is used as a means of finding feasible allotment plans. Specifically, we present a two-phase solution procedure for the satellite location problem (SLP). The objective in SLP is to allot geostationary orbital locations to satellites so as to minimize the sum of the absolute differences between the locations prescribed for the satellites and corresponding specified desired locations. We describe two heuristics, an ordering procedure and a k-permutation algorithm, that are used in tandem to find solutions to SLP. Solutions to a worldwide example problem with 183 satellites serving 208 service areas are summarized.     

Challenges of measuring progress in Afghanistan using violence trends: the effects of aggregation,military operations,seasonality, weather,and other causal factors

Measuring nationwide progress of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan using violence trends is difficult due to several factors: aggregation of data to the national level may obfuscate disparate local trends; the observed seasonality in violence makes comparisons difficult and may obscure progress; and short-term spikes or troughs – attributable to weather, military operations and tempo, or holiday periods – heavily influence simple averaging schemes. Despite these challenges, proper understanding of violence statistics is critical to estimating the effectiveness of military forces added during a surge or redeployed as part of transition. This article explores methods for analyzing observed violence trends to identify causal factors, to provide a comparable baseline, and to inform assessments at appropriate levels of aggregation. One methodology for seasonal adjustment of violence data is discussed and shown to provide a logical baseline for examining trends. An ordinary least squares regression model is developed and implemented using time-series violence data.     

Building Legitimacy: Interactional Dynamics and the Popular Evaluation of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey

Abstract

Previous research has identified a variety of general mechanisms to explain how insurgents build legitimacy. Yet, there is often a gap between these mechanisms and the interactional dynamics of insurgencies. This article attempts to bridge this gap through a theoretically informed analysis of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) insurgency in Turkey. I show how the PKK’s efforts to cultivate legitimacy, Turkey’s counterinsurgency strategies, and civilian perceptions of the PKK, all mutually influenced one another. Based on this analysis, I argue that the mechanisms that produce popular legitimacy coevolve with insurgents’ behaviors, states’ interventions, and civilians’ perceptions.